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Emma Tominey is a Lecturer at the Department of Economics and Related Studies, University 
of York, and an Associate of the Centre for the Economics of Education. 1 Introduction
How do shocks to parental income drive adolescent human capital, such as university atten-
dance, IQ and health? Unexpected changes to family income may have a predictable e⁄ect
on child adolescent outcomes, by shifting the money parents spend on human capital invest-
ments in their children. The extent to which consumers insure themselves against changes
in income has been well documented in the economics literature,2 however little is known
about how the evolution of household income drives the human capital of their children. This
paper ￿lls the gap and makes two important innovations by ￿rstly estimating the e⁄ect of
shocks across the life cycle of childhood, from age 1-16 and secondly distinguishing between
income shocks that are permanent and transitory.
Does human capital acquisition respond to income shocks in a similar manner as con-
sumption? Theory posits that income shocks which are persistent have distinct e⁄ects on
consumption from shocks that are purely transitory3. According to the Permanent Income
Hypothesis (PIH), an income shock transmits to consumption through its change in lifetime
household wealth. Consider a permanent shock of a promotion, for example. This shock
will raise contemporaneous income but also income in all future periods. This means that
an early permanent income shock will have a larger e⁄ect upon parental investment (and
therefore child outcomes) than one realised later in the child￿ s lifetime. The reason is that
ceteris paribus, a permanent shock realised at birth will drive more future income realisations
than a shock at age 16.
On the other hand, the PIH predicts a di⁄erent transmission of transitory income shocks
to child human capital. A transitory shock such as a bonus changes contemporaneous income
and potentially income for a few future periods but is mean reverting. Under incomplete
insurance, unexpected ￿ uctuations in transitory income alter lifetime wealth by the product
of 1/T and the value of the shock.4 These shocks are absorbed through borrowing or saving
and, both consumption and parental investment are smoothed. Consequently, the e⁄ect of
transitory income shocks to the eventual stock of child human capital is lower than that
for permanent shocks, but this di⁄erence decreases across child age. If human capital accu-
mulation behaves similarly to consumption, I expect to ￿nd that permanent income shocks
have an e⁄ect on adolescent outcomes which declines in the age of the child when shocks are
realised and transitory income shocks have a small but constant e⁄ect.
2Deaton (1992) provides a good summary. Blundell & Preston (1998), Attanasio et al (2002), Blundell et
al (2008) examine consumption responses to income changes and Adda et al (2009) look at health responses
to income shocks.
3See Friedman (1957).
4T denotes the total periods of labour market participation of parents.
2The PIH thus predicts heterogeneous e⁄ects across the child life cycle. Indeed, a recent
literature suggests that the determinant of adolescent college enrolment is not contempora-
neous income, but rather the ￿ ow of parental income across childhood. Cameron & Heckman
(2001), Keane & Wolpin (2001) and Cameron & Taber (2004) argue that it is not the pres-
ence of credit constraints at the point in time when individuals decide to enter college that
drives that decision, but rather a binding lifetime credit constraints which alter human cap-
ital investment throughout childhood. As such this paper analyses the role of income shocks
at every age of childhood, from birth up until age 16.
I explore heterogeneity in the time pro￿le of the e⁄ect of transitory income shocks upon
outcomes, by focusing on liquidity constrained households. With imperfect access to credit
markets, liquidity constrained agents are unable to borrow or save in order to smooth tran-
sitory income shocks su¢ ciently. Consequently I would expect to ￿nd a larger e⁄ect of
transitory income shock in liquidity constrained households.
The decomposition of the e⁄ect of family income shocks upon child outcomes by the
durability of the shock and the age of the child, has not currently been explored by literature.
One potential reason is a lack of adequate data. The data in this paper takes the population
of around 600,000 Norwegian children, born in the 1970s and tracked through to 2006,
which provides in depth information on annual household income plus a range of adolescent
outcomes, including years of schooling, high school dropout, university attendance and IQ
and health test scores from a set of army tests for males.
There are of course contributions from the empirical literature along several relevant
dimensions. A literature suggests that a potential mechanism through which parental income
shocks drive child outcomes is through a shift in parental investments in child human capital.5
The e⁄ect of speci￿c shocks to the household upon child outcomes has been investigated in
a number of papers6. Akee et al (2010) found that the age of the child when the shock
was realised strongly conditioned the e⁄ect of that shock. In particular, the e⁄ect of an
exogeneous and permanent government transfer to households had a larger e⁄ect on schooling
and crime outcomes for children with six, rather than two years exposure to the higher
income.
Interestingly, the predictions of the e⁄ect of timing of income levels di⁄ers markedly from
the timing of income shocks. In the absence of credit constraints, a simple model predicts
5Cunha & Heckman (2007, 2008) and Cunha et al (2010) distinguish between ￿nancial such as books,
private tuition and time investments such as reading to children and trips to a museum. A negative income
shock of unemployment could lead parents to change money or time spent on their children, e.g. cancel a
private tutor in the one case or help the child with homework in the other. Ginja (2009) ￿nds that investment
goods are responsive to an unexpected change in family income.
6There are many examples. One is by Chen et al (2009), who explore the e⁄ect of unexpected parental
death upon the probability of enrolling in college, in Taiwan.
3that parental investment in human capital does not respond to the timing of income, given
permanent income. Parents would optimally borrow and save to smooth the e⁄ect of the
timing of income.7 However, in this paper the model is extended to allow for income uncer-
tainty. Unexpected changes in income lead to predictable changes in parental investment
(which depend upon the durability of the income shock and child age) and therefore child
adolescent outcomes.
Finally, it is worth noting that a component of the e⁄ect of income shocks is parental
insurance. If children are fully insured against the income shock, the data will reveal a zero
e⁄ect across child age. A number of papers have established that the human capital of young
adults is partially insured by their parents.8 For example, Kaplan (2007) ￿nds that youths
faced with labour market risk call upon both ￿nancial transfers and co-residence as insurance
mechanisms and Rosenzweig & Wolpin (1993) suggest that parental insurance is required in
addition to government insurance, even against anticipated income shocks.
There are important policy implications inherent in this study. Cunha (2005) and Cunha
& Heckman (2007, 2008) posit that parental investment will be more e⁄ective early in the
lifetime of a child. Firstly, neurological arguments suggest that early investments into cog-
nitive ability will have a higher return than later investment9. This combined with the
suggestion that there are dynamic complementarities in the return to investment, such that
the return to early (late) investment is increasing in the level of late (early) investment,
points e⁄ective policy making towards the early years. Family income is arguably easier to
target by governments than parental investment and as such, this paper estimates the value
of government insurance for households with children, against unexpected changes to income.
As noted above, the largest e⁄ect is expected for permanent shocks early in the lifetime of a
child. However, it is transitory shocks which provide the relevant policy experiment, as they
are insurable by government whereas permanent shocks in general, are not.10
The methodology used in this paper follows two stages. Firstly, a structural model of
the parental income process decomposes income shocks into permanent and transitory com-
ponents. Secondly, the reduced form e⁄ects of the separate shocks, experienced at di⁄erent
ages in the child￿ s life, on their eventual child capital levels are estimated.11
7Carneiro et al (2010) do indeed ￿nd evidence of a relatively ￿ at pro￿le of the e⁄ect of the timing of
income, although there is some evidence of dynamic complementarity in the return. On the other hand,
Jenkins & Schluter (2002) ￿nd a higher return to late, and Levy & Duncan (2000) ￿nds a higher return to
early years income.
8See for example Hayashi et al (1996), Martins & Villanueva (2009) and Becker et al (2010).
9For example, the cohort-ranking of IQ is set very early, at around age 5.
10There are of course exceptions, such as governments tend to guarantee a subsistence level of income and
additionally insurance against loss of income through disability.
11Paxson (1992), Shapiro & Slemrod (1995), Parker (1999) and Souleles (1999) adopt an alternative
methodology by exploiting exogeneous variation in income to identify the role of transitory income shocks
4A necessary ￿rst step therefore is to gather empirical evidence as to the income process
that is applied to the structural model. I use a panel of around 400,000 parents observed
across a 30 year period to estimate the autocovariances of income growth. Permanent income
is assumed to follow a random walk and the evidence suggests that transitory income is
best described by an MA(1) or MA(2) process. Next, deviations of household income from
the life cycle trend are predicted in each year of child life. Moment conditions from the
income process allow a decomposition into permanent and transitory income shocks from
early childhood to adolescence. These are estimated at the level of the cohort within a
labour market.12 Finally, the e⁄ect of both types of shock, realised across the child life cycle,
is estimated in a reduced form equation on the eventual stock of adolescent human capital
outcomes. The model allows for correlation between an initial condition in household income
and a parental ￿xed e⁄ect in child human capital. The identi￿cation assumption in the ￿rst
stage decomposition is that second order moments of the permanent and transitory income
shocks di⁄er across child age, cohorts and labour markets, but that the e⁄ect of these shocks
varies only across child age. The second stage identi￿cation assumption is that estimated
income shocks are exogeneous and unexpected by households. The former is based upon
evidence from 400,000 households across 30 years and the latter is tested in two robustness
checks.
The data indicate a strong and signi￿cant correlation between the initial condition and
child outcomes. A rise in initial income levels by 1 standard deviation raises child human cap-
ital by up to 0.4 standard deviations (equivalent, for example, to nearly a year of schooling).
This shows that family background matters - there is signi￿cant dispersion in outcomes for
the sample of Norwegian children, determined at the start of their lifetime. For all outcomes
except health, the e⁄ect of a household permanent income shock is signi￿cant and declines
across child age, as predicted by the PIH. However there is volatility in this relationship,
which may be picking up changes in maternal labour supply. Mothers have less attachment
to the labour market and their labour supply is more sensitive, for example to children start-
ing school. By focusing just on paternal income, noise in the decline is smoothed out for
all outcomes. The di⁄erence in the health outcome is likely due to crude measurement in
the data.13 In general, permanent shocks to paternal income have a large e⁄ect early in the
lifetime of the child and this e⁄ect falls across child age, to zero at age 16.
upon consumption. For this paper, it would be very cumbersome, if not impossible, to ￿nd strong instruments
for both permanent and transitory income shocks throughout the lifetime of children.
12The method is a slight adaptation to Mo¢ tt & Gottschalk (1995), Meghir & Pistaferri (2004) and
Blundell et al (2008) and similar to Jappelli & Pistaferri (2008).
13In all speci￿cations, for both permanent and transitory shocks, there is a noisy and insigni￿cant e⁄ect
of shocks on health.
5For all outcomes, transitory income shocks have a small and constant e⁄ect across child
age. This suggests that parents are optimising, by smoothing parental investment against
transitory shocks in a similar manner to consumption smoothing.
However interestingly, for a sample of liquidity constrained parents, child human capital
behaves di⁄erently to consumption upon receipt of an income shock. It was anticipated
that human capital responses to income shocks would be larger for the liquidity constrained
sample, as without full access to the credit markets, parents are unable to smooth the e⁄ect
of the shock. Instead, transitory income shocks have a smaller e⁄ect on child human capital
for a group of households with permanent income in the second decile or below, compared to
the total sample.14 I argue that for this group of parents, investment goods such as books,
high quality nursery care or private tuition are not necessities given that children receive
free state education. Rather, liquidity constrained parents raise consumption on goods like
household utilities, child clothing and food when they receive an income shock.
The results are robust to a change in the income process which extends the MA process
of transitory income to second order and also to two tests for the endogeneity of income.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting in Norway,
section 3 discusses the Norwegian data. In section 4, the income process for the sample of
parents in Norway is estimated to inform the structural model. The empirical strategy is
pursued in section 5, section 6 discusses the results and section 7 the robustness checks.
Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 The Norwegian Setting
The population of children born between 1970-1980 form the dataset for this paper. This
section explains the relevant institutional setting faced by the parents and children.
In 1969, an educational reform extended the compulsory schooling in Norway from 8 to
9 years, raising the school leaving age from 15 to 16. This means that the parents of the
sample children will be composed of those facing the new and the old system. (80% of mums
and 91% of dads faced the compulsory age of 16). On average, mothers and fathers report
10.8 and 11.3 years of schooling respectively for themselves (which translates into a leaving
age of 17.8 and 18.3).
Although Norway is today known for being a very progressive country, they were quite
late in their adoption of family policies. To give an example, prior to 1977 there was a very
low level of maternity leave available. Mothers could take up to 12 weeks of leave, but with
large variation in the remuneration. In 1977, there was a reform, evaluated by Carneiro et al
14Permanent income is de￿ned as the sum of income across child age, from 0-18.
6(2010b), which changed the system to one where mothers were granted up to a year of leave,
with the ￿rst 18 weeks paid at the full salary. Tying in with this low level of maternity leave,
for the most of the 1970s, there was a very low level of formal child care take up.15 There
was, and still is, no free child care prior to compulsory schooling. The consequence was that
during the early 1970s, the majority of mothers did not go to work but stayed at home to
look after the children. In the data of this paper, only 30% of mothers were working two
years after they had given birth, compared to 60% of mothers in 1980.
Schooling in Norway is now compulsory from age 6 to age 16, although the children of
this study started school in the year they turned 7. There was free access to school age
education and readily available loans to students attending university. The analysis in this
paper considers how income shocks received up to age 16 drive later outcomes and therefore
excludes shocks realised after making the decision to extend schooling after the compulsory
age.
3 Data
The Norwegian Registry data, an administrative dataset provides information for the analy-
sis. Annual information is recorded for the population of Norway on a range of variables,
linking across generations of the same family their records from birth, education, labour
market and marriage market status.16 Table 1 displays the summary statistics for the data,
containing 616,210 children born to 399,603 families. The chosen sample contains the pop-
ulation of children born in Norway between 1970-1980.
It is possible to de￿ne a wide range of child human capital outcomes, recorded during
their adolescence. Educational status is measured as late as 2006, meaning that the youngest
children in the sample are aged 26 by this time and likely to have completed their education.
Three education variables are de￿ned for the analysis. Firstly, years of completed education
is recorded for the full sample, with a mean value of 12.70 years. Secondly, a focus on
the bottom of the educational distribution records a dummy variable equal to one if the
child dropped out of high school before receiving a certi￿cate for vocational or academic
education. Without this certi￿cate, students￿future paths are restricted and for example,
they will not be able to attend university. 22% of students in the sample are recorded as
dropout students.17 The ￿nal educational record is attendance at college/university, which
applies to 39% of students. There is clearly polarisation in educational attainment in Norway.
15Only 10% for 3-6 year olds in 1975 but almost none for 1-2 year olds, according to Havnes & Mogstad
(2009).
16For full details on the data, see Młen et al (2004).
17This outcome is referred to as high school dropout, for simplicity.
7Military service is compulsory in Norway for males, who take tests including a measure
of IQ and health for entry to the army at around age 18. The IQ score is a composite score
from arithmetic, word similarities and Figures tests. The arithmetic and word tests are most
similar to the Wechsler Adult Intelligent Scale (WAIS) and the Figures test to the Raven
Progressive matrix, which are approved by psychologists as measures of IQ.18 The continuous
scores are banded into a 9 point scale, with a mean of 5.21. Also measured in these is an
indicator of physical health. The score is again on a 9 point scale, with 9 indicating perfect
health. As the mean value of the score is 8.44, it is clear that this test in fact records perfect
physical health for the majority of the sample (85%).19 Only 90% of individuals take tests
aged 18, however Black et al (2008) describe a strong and signi￿cant relationship between
the year individuals turned 18 and the year they took the tests.
I link the child unique identi￿er from the educational datasets to the mother and father
from the birth certi￿cate and match income and years of education for each parent from
1967-2006. Income is de￿ ated to 2000 prices and household income calculated as the sum of
paternal and maternal income if both parents are known, or one parent otherwise. Marital
status information is available for all relevant years of the sample. If families break up, I
continue to measure household income as the sum across biological parents. However, when
I come to estimate income shocks, I control for marital status, in order to remove income
shocks from marriage break-up.
The paternal identi￿er is linked to the municipality of residence in each year. If a pa-
ternal identi￿er is missing, the maternal identi￿er is used instead. There are around 450
municipalities in Norway. However, it is the local labour market identi￿er that is used in the
analysis, so as to appropriately group areas by something similar to a travel-to-work-area
(TTWA). Geographers in Norway have de￿ned 90 labour markets in Norway. From the
sample of parents contained in the dataset, the labour market size varies between 1,000 and
65,000 households. For a large majority of children in the sample (78%), the labour market
observed when the child is born is identical to that at age 16. I keep only these children in
our sample, so as to be able to de￿ne the local labour market of the child as being constant
across the lifetime of the child.20
18For more information, see Sundet et al (2004, 2005).
19In an alternative speci￿cation, a dummy variable was equal to one if individuals scored 9 and zero
otherwise. The results for this outcome were almost identical to the 9 point scale.
20The mean di⁄erence in child and parental outcomes for two samples of movers and non-movers is no
more than 30% of a standard deviation.
84 Income Process in Norway
In the empirical section below, the e⁄ects of transitory and permanent income shocks across
child age are identi￿ed for a particular income process. This section aims to infer the
correct income process using very detailed administrative income data for the population of
Norwegian parents, from 1970 to the present. Meghir & Pistaferri (2004) and Blundell et
al (2008) suggest that in the US, a permanent transitory model of income is appropriate,
whereby permanent income is a martingale and transitory income serially uncorrelated or a
￿rst order Moving Average process (MA(1)). In the UK, Dickens (2000) estimates a random
walk in age for permanent income and a serially correlated transitory component. Bonhomme
& Robin (2009) model income in France as a (deterministic component plus) a ￿xed e⁄ect
and ￿rst order Markov process for transitory income. In Norway the income process is as
yet unknown, warranting further investigation before making assumptions in the empirical
model.
Two methods are used to understand the time series properties of the income process.
A panel of income is constructed for each household across time, from 1970-2000, for those
who had a child between 1970-1980. This constitutes nearly 400,000 households. Household
income is calculated as the sum of paternal and maternal income, de￿ ated to 2000 prices.
First, the variance of income is plotted across the life cycle for the sample of mothers and
fathers. If a random walk describes permanent income, the variance of income will be an
increasing function of age, assuming independence of the shocks, as each shock lasts for
a lifetime. Figures 1a) and 1b) plot the variance of income for the mothers and fathers
respectively. For the mothers, there is a clear increasing relationship in the variance of
earnings across age for the middle periods. During the early years in the labour market
and around retirement, the relationship di⁄ers. The same is true of fathers, except for some
outliers in the 40s. Of course, there are other reasons why variance of income may increase
across time, however this evidence does not rule out a random walk permanent component
to income.
The second methodology employed, following MaCurdy (1982), seeks to understand the
ARMA transitory income process. Similarly to the aforementioned papers, I assume a per-
manent component to income and estimate the income process for household transitory
income.
Consider the model lnwit = Z0
it’+Pit+vit where P and v are the permanent and transi-
tory components respectively of log income (lnw) for household i in period t: Z denotes a set
of covariates and ’ a vector of coe¢ cients. The permanent component follows a martingale,
hence Pit = Pit￿1 + ￿it where ￿ denotes the permanent income shock, independently and
9identically distributed (iid) across i and t. This section estimates the ARMA(p;q) process







mj"it￿j where m0 = 1: at and mt are the lag coe¢ cients and equal
zero if there is no persistence in transitory income. " denotes the transitory income shock
to the level of transitory income (v). The orders p and q of the AR and MA components are
to be established empirically.
To analyse the persistence of the transitory income component separately to the perma-
nent component, I follow MaCurdy (1982), Meghir & Pistaferri (2004) and Blundell et al
(2008) and estimate the residuals from ￿rst di⁄erences in income ￿lnwit = ￿Z0
it’+￿it+￿vit;
where ￿xt = xt ￿ xt￿1: The order of the AR process of the ￿rst di⁄erenced disturbances is
the same as in the levels, however ￿rst di⁄erencing changes the order of the estimated MA
process to (q + 1):
The ￿rst stage is to estimate residuals from a system of equations of ￿rst di⁄erence log
wages in period t for household i. The controls (Z) are a quadratic in maternal and paternal
age, maternal and paternal education, marital status and municipality of residence. Results
are in column 1 of Table 2. Income growth is decreasing in the age of mothers and fathers,
at a decreasing rate and increasing in education. There is additionally a negative coe¢ cient
on marital status.






= ￿k + !t , where ! is the error in the autocovariance process and
k = f1;::;8g: For each lag k, the autocovariances are estimated in a system of equations
across t where the coe¢ cient on the autocovariance is constrained to be constant in each
regression. Two potential di¢ culties with estimating the autocovariances are ￿rstly that
the residuals are estimated in a ￿rst stage and secondly that there may be serial correlation
across time for households. However, MaCurdy (1981) notes that using a seemingly unrelated
regression procedure to estimate autocovariances will result in parameters and test statistics
that are asymptotically valid.
The results are reported in Table 3. The estimated autocovariances are initially negative
at one lag but fall close to zero after the ￿rst lag, although it remains signi￿cant. Again,
between lags 2 and 3 there is another sharp drop in the autocovariances and after lag 3, they
are no longer signi￿cant. This is suggestive of a low order MA process, of the order of 2 or
3 in di⁄erences, or of order 1 or 2 in levels.
In conclusion, permanent income will follow a random walk and transitory income an
MA process where I will estimate the model initially for a ￿rst order process and test the
robustness of results to a second order process. This is the similar income process found in




Log wages (lnw) for the observation i in period t are modelled as a linear function of a
permanent and a transitory component (denoted P and v respectively) and a deterministic
component of covariates (Z)
lnwit = Z
0
it’t + Pit + vit (1)
where i = 1;::;N and t = 1;::;T: The unit of observation is the household-child pair.
Permanent income follows a martingale (equation 2) and transitory income is a serially
correlated MA(1) process (equation 3), where ￿ and " denote the permanent and transitory
income shocks respectively and ￿ the ￿rst order MA coe¢ cient. Section 4 provided evidence
that this is a good representation of the true income process for the sample of Norwegian
parents.
Pit = Pit￿1 + ￿it (2)
vit = ￿"it￿1 + "it (3)
Both permanent and transitory shocks are assumed to have a mean of zero and be
uncorrelated with each other, E (￿it) = E ("it) = E (￿it"it) = 0; t = 1;::;T; i = 1;::;N.
Following Meghir & Pistaferri (2004), de￿ne y as log income with the e⁄ect of the co-
variates removed in a ￿rst stage, yit = lnwit ￿ Z0
it’t = Pit + ￿"t￿1 + "it: Substituting in for
the permanent income component gives
yit = Pi0 +
t P
s=1
￿is + ￿"it￿1 + "it (4)
Income in period t is the sum of P0; the initial level of permanent income at the start of
the child￿ s lifetime, representing an unobservable endowment or initial condition, past and
contemporaneous permanent income shocks and transitory shocks current and at one lag.
115.2 Child Human Capital Equation
The stock of child human capital (h) accumulates at the end of a lifetime of parental in-
vestment. The reduced form equation (5) shows human capital in the ￿nal period, T 21, to
be a function of income in each period of life, where a di⁄erent coe¢ cient is allowed for
permanent and transitory components of income, a set of parental traits X; a child level
idiosyncratic error uiT and initial endowment, ￿i0 (for example genes or parental unobserv-
able characteristics).22 Parents optimise levels of parental investment and consumption to
maximise their utility, which is a function of the child￿ s stock of human capital in period T,
hence human capital has a subscript i relating both to child and parent. When estimating
the coe¢ cients on income across time, it is important to allow for the value of money to
change across time, through the interest rate, r: Money received in period 1 will be worth
(1 + r) times as much in the following period if it is saved. Terminal period human capital
is a function of the present value of income at age 0, in each period.














t + ￿i0 + uiT (5)
Repeatedly substituting for Pit and substituting for vit gives





















t (￿"it￿1 + "it) + ￿i0 + uiT (6)
Income shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated with u and u has mean zero; E (uiT"it) =
E (uiT￿it) = E (uiT) = 0; t = 1;::;T, i = 1;::;N. However, the initial condition in income
is correlated with with the parental ￿xed e⁄ect: E (Pi0￿i0) 6= 0: Both Pi0 and ￿i0 cannot
be separately observed, as they are initial conditions causing an identi￿cation problem, the
consequences of which can be seen in the identi￿cation section below.
5.3 Identi￿cation
Cohort-Local Labour Market Level Analysis It is possible to decompose shocks into
permanent and transitory components by exploiting variation in the second order moments
of income, across cohorts of children in di⁄erent labour markets. This method is similar to
Blundell et al (2008) and Adda et al (2009), both of whom used time variation in variance
of shocks.
21measured by schooling outcomes, IQ, teen pregnancy and health
22X may include covariates in Z and additional child level variables. Income shocks control for Z and it
is assumed that other covarites in X are uncorrelated with shocks.
12Meghir & Pistaferri (2004) identify the moments of the income process using information
on income alone. Given the income process above, the covariance matrix of income at
di⁄erent lags is given for a cohort and labour market (c) by

























"t denote the variance of permanent and transitory shocks in period t,
respectively. It is the aggregation to cohort-labour market which allows identi￿cation of all
variance terms, with the exception of ￿2
"T;￿2
￿T; which are not separately identi￿able. For this
reason, an additional year of data is included in the period T + 1.23
The covariance matrix between income in each year of the child￿ s lifetime and human











































































































"t + ￿￿0P0 if t = T
(8)
where ￿￿0P0 denotes the correlation between P0 and ￿0. For notational ease, the discount-
ing by interest rate r has been omitted, and coe¢ cients in equation (8) have been adjusted
to denote present values as at period 0. As noted above, the two initial conditions cannot
be separately identi￿ed and consequently, the coe¢ cient on P0 will be interpreted as the
correlation between the parental initial condition and the ￿xed e⁄ect. However, all other
parameters are identi￿ed. ￿ is estimated empirically.
Identi￿cation comes from variance of shocks across cohorts and labour markets. The
23This means that ￿2
"T+1and ￿2
￿T+1 cannot be distinguished.
13inherent identi￿cation assumption for the ￿rst stage is that second order moments of the
permanent and transitory income process di⁄er across cohorts, labour markets and child
age, but that the e⁄ect of these shocks upon child outcomes di⁄ers only across child age.
Identi￿cation of equation (8) relies on the estimated shocks to income being truly unexpected
by households and exogeneous. Endogeneity of income from heterogeneous life cycle pro￿les
and the presence of siblings is explored in Sections 7.2 & 7.3.
Measurement error is omitted from the model to date. Meghir & Pistaferri (2004) es-
timate that between a quarter and a third of the transitory income shock variation is due
to measurement error in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). However, the bias is
likely to be smaller in the current sample, as income is recorded from administrative data.
The variance of permanent shocks is una⁄ected by the presence of measurement error.
6 Results
6.1 Income Shocks
The ￿rst stage of the analysis is to predict annual household income shocks, from the life
cycle pro￿le of income. A regression of log household income is run upon a constant, a
quadratic in age, education, marital status and dummies for municipality of residence and
year. The ￿rst stage regressions, in column 2 of Table 2, show log income increasing in
parental age, but at a decreasing rate. Additionally, parent￿ s education and marital status
raise the household wage. The residuals estimated from these regressions indicate income
shocks in the magnitude of 0.3-1% of annual income.
The estimation of household shocks is such that all households experience an income
shock, as the annual deviation from their life cycle pro￿le. Hence the incidence of an income
shock will be uncorrelated with parental traits. As the variance of the income shocks is used
for identi￿cation, it is worthwhile to explore any correlation between the variance of income
shocks across a lifetime and family traits. A regression at the level of the household, of
the standard deviation of lifetime income shocks upon a quadratic in maternal and paternal
education shows that households with a low level of education have a relatively high variance
of shocks and the slope is increasing across education.24 The same pattern holds when
running the regression at the level of the labour market.
24The coe¢ cients (standard deviations) on maternal and paternal education are -0.03(0.00003) and -
0.03(0.0006) and on the quadratic terms 0.001(0.00003) and 0.001(0.00003) respectively.
146.2 Distribution of income shocks
A diagonally weighted minimum distance procedure generates estimates for the variances
of the initial level of permanent income and per period transitory and permanent income
shocks. Details are in Appendix 1.
Table 4 reports the standard deviation of the initial level of permanent income, permanent
and transitory income shocks, for each cohort (from 1970-1980) and labour market (of which
there are 90) and across the age of the child. This gives in total 36,630 estimates of the
standard deviation of income shocks and the MA parameter. The ￿rst two columns of the
table summarise these estimates, listing the mean and standard deviation across the 990
cohort-labour market cells. A potential worry with aggregating to the level of the cohort-
labour market, is that much of the standard deviation in income shocks may exist across,
not within labour markets or cohorts. If this were the case, the ￿nal estimates of the e⁄ect
of income shocks on child human capital will not be representative of the population as a
whole. Therefore, in column 3, the standard deviations of income shocks estimated on the
total sample, allowing comparison of cohort-labour market level and population second order
moments.
The ￿rst row of Table 4 shows that the standard deviation of log initial permanent income
is 0.0480. This means that, even controlling for parental education, a polynomial of age and
marital status, the initial condition in permanent income has a standard deviation of 5%.
The population level standard deviation is similar to the labour market mean, at 0.0679 (or
about 7%), suggesting that exploiting cohort and labour market di⁄erences in variances of
shocks for identi￿cation is reasonable.
The standard deviation of transitory shocks at ages 0-17 are reported in the next rows.
These tend to be fairly stable at approximately 0.1 standard deviations until the ￿nal years
of child age when they fall to 0.03-0.06. The standard deviation of permanent shocks is much
smaller, as would be expected. Permanent shocks last for a lifetime, therefore a small shock
can be very important. The range is between 0.0051 and 0.0141 across the years. Again,
the cohort-labour market variances resemble closely the population variances. Recall from
above that it is not possible to identify the ￿nal variance of transitory or permanent shocks.
The MA parameter is high in the total sample, although falls noticeably in column 4, once
maternal income is excluded. The MA coe¢ cient in column 4 is very similar to estimates of
the income process for males.25
25Dickens (2000) estimates an ARMA process for transitory income with an AR coe¢ cient of 0.96 and
MA coe¢ cient of -0.57. and Mo¢ t & Gottschalk (1995) estimate the MA coe¢ cient of -0.67. These papers
are the natural comparison, decomposing the covariance structure of income levels, whereas other papers in
the literature estimate the process for ￿rst di⁄erences in income.
156.3 E⁄ect of shocks on adolescent outcomes
An innovative aspect of this paper is estimation of the e⁄ect of the household permanent
and transitory income shocks upon child outcomes. This section documents the results,
examining whether the realisation of transitory and permanent income shocks will have a
heterogeneous e⁄ect upon child outcomes, depending upon the age of the child at realisation.
The variances of transitory and permanent income shocks across child age are applied to
equation (8) to estimate the e⁄ect of the income shocks upon child human capital outcomes.
The human capital equation (6) allows the e⁄ect of income shocks to vary across child
age. Before estimating this complex model, it is interesting to restrict the coe¢ cients to be
homogeneous across child age, estimating the following function
hiT = ￿0 + ￿1Pi0 + ￿2￿it + ￿3"it + ￿i0 + uiT; t = 1;::;16:
A panel data is constructed at the cohort - labour market - child age level. Regression
results are reported in Table 5. There are15840 observations (90 labour markets, 11 cohorts,
for ages 1-16).26 Two di⁄erent functional forms are estimated. In columns 1, 3, 5, 7 & 9, the
human capital outcomes are estimated as a linear function of the initial level of permanent
income (P0), a transitory income shock and a permanent income shock. Columns 2, 4, 6,
8 & 10 include an interaction term of permanent (transitory) shocks with child age thus
allowing some heterogeneity in the e⁄ect of income shocks across child age. The variable
high school dropout has been rede￿ned, to indicate completion of high school, to enable ease
of comparison with the other outcomes.
The estimates are standardised so that both the income shocks and the outcomes are
expressed in terms of a standard deviation. Put another way, the coe¢ cient represents the
standard deviation change in the outcome from a standard deviation change in the income
shock.
Starting with the ￿rst outcome in column 1, a change in P0 by a standard deviation
(5%) is correlated with an increase in completed years of child schooling by 1.177 standard
deviations. Columns 3, 5, 7 & 9 show that there is a strong and signi￿cant e⁄ect of P0
for all other outcomes, except health. This e⁄ect is similar regardless of the speci￿cation of
transitory and permanent income shocks. Raising P0 by 5% is correlated with higher values
of years of schooling, probability of completing out of high school, college attendance, IQ
and health by up to 1.193, 0.206, 0.156, 0.763, and 0.171 standard deviations respectively.
This indicates a strong correlate between family background and child outcomes.
The ￿rst column of data for each outcome shows that transitory income shocks improve
child human capital (columns 1, 3, 5, 7 & 9), however once the interaction between transi-
26It is not possible to distinguish transitory and permanent shocks at age 17.
16tory shocks and child age is added, the level e⁄ect becomes negative or insigni￿cant. The
interaction between transitory income shock and child age is positive - initially there is a
negative e⁄ect of transitory shocks which is increasing across child age. Permanent shocks
have a larger e⁄ect on education, high school dropout and IQ, as would be expected from
the PIH. The interaction between permanent shocks and child age is insigni￿cant.
Next, the fully ￿ exible model is estimated from equation (8) and the age speci￿c coef-
￿cients on the permanent and transitory income shocks and initial permanent income are
reported in Table 6a and 6b. Again, the coe¢ cients report the e⁄ect of a standard deviation
change in the speci￿c income shock, upon the standard deviation change in human capital.
The results of the e⁄ect of permanent and transitory shocks across child age are easier to
see in graphical form hence additionally, Figures 2a-2j plot the coe¢ cients across age, again
in standard deviations of the child outcome.
Initial Condition in Income Examining ￿rst how the initial condition in income
drives child human capital outcomes, in row 1 from Tables 6a and 6b the log initial level of
permanent income (reported as age 0, permanent) has a strong and signi￿cant value. This
picks up the correlation between family background and child achievement. For years of
schooling, the coe¢ cient is 0.3795, meaning that a standard deviation increase in the initial
condition is correlated with higher schooling by 0.38 standard deviations, equivalent to 0.93
years of schooling. For the other outcomes, a standard deviation increase in P0 is correlated
with an increase in the probability of dropping out of high school, college attendance, IQ
and health by 0.2668, 0.3494, 0.2895 and 0.0230 standard deviations respectively (equivalent
to an increase of 11%, 17.1%, 0.52 points and 0.04 points for dropout, college, IQ and health
respectively). The smallest correlate is on the health outcome. As health is measured on a
9 point scale, with a very large majority of participants receiving the top score of 9, it is not
surprising that the measure is not highly correlated with the initial condition. The strong
correlation between the initial condition and the parental ￿xed e⁄ect indicates signi￿cant
dispersion in outcomes by family background at birth in Norway.
Permanent Income Shocks Figures 2a, c, e, g & i plot the coe¢ cients on permanent
income shocks realised in every year of the child￿ s lifetime, upon the range of child outcomes.
These relate to the columns labelled "Permanent" for ages 1-16 in Tables 6a and 6b.
A standard deviation increase in the permanent shock at age 1 raises schooling by 0.0866
standard deviations. This transmission falls initially across child age, albeit nosily, such that
a shock at age 16 has a smaller e⁄ect than at age 1, raising schooling by only 0.0019 standard
deviations. The larger e⁄ect of the permanent shock realised during early years is intuitive,
17given that the early permanent shock shifts household wealth forever and therefore drive
income realisations for all future periods.
A very similar pattern between the transmission e⁄ect of permanent income shocks re-
alised across child age, upon the probability of completing high school and college completion,
is observed in Figure 2c and 2e respectively. The e⁄ect is large at age 1 (a 1 standard devia-
tion increase in the shock raises the probability of completing high school (college attendance)
by 0.0599 (0.0659) standard deviations) and the transmission e⁄ect declines across child age
such that a 1 standard deviation shock at age 16 raises the probability of competing high
school (college) by 0.0094 (-0.0077) standard deviations. Again the decline is noisy, with
jumps in the e⁄ect around ages 2, 6, 9 and 15.
For the outcome IQ in Figure 2g (for males only), the e⁄ect of permanent income shocks
between ages 1-8 is relatively ￿ at, with a decreasing slope from age 9-16. A pure permanent
income e⁄ect would lead to a declining curve, but for early years the return to income shocks
remains high. One interpretation is that the e⁄ect does not fall in early years because as
Cunha & Heckman (2007, 2008) suggest, cognitive ability is more malleable in early years
and therefore more sensitive to parental income shocks.
Figure 2i shows that there is a noisy transmission e⁄ect of permanent shocks upon health,
with the coe¢ cients all insigni￿cantly di⁄erent to zero. It cannot be ruled out that the noisy
pattern is due to the poor measurement of health as 85% of the boys achieved the highest
score of physical health.
A permanent income shock realised when the child is age 1 is realised in all future
income and therefore the declining e⁄ect of the shock across child age is intuitive. It changes
household wealth for all future periods and therefore has a larger e⁄ect upon child outcomes.
Thus, the transmission e⁄ect of permanent shocks to child human capital behave similarly
as the e⁄ect of consumption.
However the decline across child age is noisy. There tends to be a jump in the year after
birth, at ages 6, 9 and 15. These jumps may coincide with maternal labour supply. For
example, permanent income would increase if mothers go back to work after having a child.
This raises the question of whether the shocks as estimated in this paper, are truly shocks,
or anticipated by the households themselves. If the shock just picks up an expected change
in labour supply, then the resulting change in child outcomes (through adjusted parental
investment) would not be as the model predicted. One way to overcome this problem would
be to run the analysis solely on paternal income, which ￿ uctuates less around maternity
leave and child schooling. These results are reported in the following section.
18Transitory Income Shocks Turning now to the transmission between transitory in-
come shocks and child human capital, Figure 2b, d, f, h, & j plot the estimates of the e⁄ect
of transitory income shocks for ages 1-16. Again, the coe¢ cients and standard errors have
been adjusted for the standard deviation of the transitory income shocks at each child age.
The columns labelled "Transitory" in Tables 6a and 6b report the coe¢ cients and standard
errors. There is a relatively constant e⁄ect of transitory income shocks across child age
and the magnitude of the e⁄ect is lower than for permanent shocks. A standard deviation
shock increase at age 1 and age 16 raises schooling by 0.0327 and 0.0378 standard deviations
respectively. Again the e⁄ect on health is instatistically di⁄erent to zero.
To summarise, there is a large coe¢ cient on the initial level of permanent income, or
parental ￿xed e⁄ect, suggesting signi￿cant heterogeneity in child outcomes which is deter-
mined at the birth of the child. This is interesting, as often Norway is considered a very
equal country, with a compressed income distribution. However, the evidence suggests large
variance in outcomes driven by a family initial condition.
Two ￿ndings, that the transmission of transitory shocks to outcomes is constant across
age, and of a lower magnitude than permanent shocks, are consistent with the PIH. The
annuity value of a permanent income shock at age 1 is greater than for a transitory shock.
Interestingly, the coe¢ cients of the permanent and transitory income shocks converge
towards the ￿nal period. This is consistent with the idea that a permanent shock in the
￿nal period of human capital investment should drive human capital to a similar degree as
a transitory income shock in that period. Moving towards the terminal period of human
capital accumulation, the annuity value of the permanent and transitory shock aligns and
so therefore does the e⁄ect of the shocks.
6.4 Paternal Income
The above analysis is repeated using paternal income shocks rather than shocks to the
sum of maternal and paternal income. The e⁄ect of a household permanent income shock
declines noisily across child age. These jumps may coincide with a change in maternal labour
supply which shifts permanent income. For example, the age 2 jump could re￿ ect ending
maternity leave and at age 7 the children started school, freeing up the mothers to enter the
labour market. This section estimates the e⁄ect of paternal income shocks, excluding any
contribution from maternal income. This method does not remove the endogeneous decision
of mothers to enter the labour market, as this decision is made jointly with paternal labour
supply. However, paternal labour supply is arguably less sensitive to such changes across the
child life cycle
19Estimated standard deviations of the shocks are reported in Column 4 of Table 4. The
variances are slightly higher than for the total sample.
Figures 3a-3e plot the e⁄ect of permanent shocks to both household and paternal in-
come upon child outcomes, across child age. As the variance of income shocks di⁄er across
household income and paternal income, the coe¢ cient represents the e⁄ect of a standard
deviation change in household income shock.27 Indeed, the ￿gures show that when only
paternal income is considered, the e⁄ect of permanent income shocks falls more smoothly
from the age of 1 to 16 than was observed for household income. The paternal permanent
income e⁄ect lies slightly below the household e⁄ect for early years, however the di⁄erence
is insigni￿cant.28
6.5 Liquidity Constrained Sample
If parents face binding liquidity constraints, they will be unable to borrow and save in order
to smooth transitory income shocks. Consequently, the e⁄ect of transitory shocks will be
larger for a liquidity constrained sample. It is interesting to see whether the accumulation of
child human capital of liquidity constrained parents responds similarly to consumption, by
repeating the above analysis on a group of poor parents, most likely to face credit constraints.
To do so, I de￿ne a household to be liquidity constrained if their permanent income is in the
second decile or below.29 Permanent income is de￿ned as the sum of real income when the
child is aged 0-18.
The standard deviations of shocks for the liquidity constrained sample are reported in
Column 5 of Table 4. The standard deviation in the initial condition is lower, as this is
a more homogeneous group in terms of income. Variances of the shocks are slightly larger
than in the total sample. Again, to compare the e⁄ect of transitory income shocks for the
liquidity constrained sample, normalisation is by the total sample variance.
Results are in Figures 4a-4e which plot the coe¢ cients for the total sample and for the
liquidity constrained (or "constrained") sample. What is instantly obvious from the ￿gures
is that, for four outcomes - years of schooling, high school dropout, college attendance
and IQ - the e⁄ect of the transitory income shocks is larger in magnitude than for the
liquidity constrained sample, although this di⁄erence is insigni￿cant for the latter outcomes.
The higher e⁄ect is contrary to expectations and suggests that human capital accumulation
behaves di⁄erently to consumption, for liquidity constrained households. To give an example,
27The results are not signi￿cantly changed by this normalisation.
28There is no statistical di⁄erence in the e⁄ect of transitory shocks to paternal income compared to
household shocks.
29Following Souleles (1999).
20the e⁄ect of a 1 standard deviation increase in transitory income shock at ages 1 and 16 upon
years of schooling, is around 0.0327 and 0.0378 standard deviations for the total sample, but
is 0.0187 and 0.0168 for the liquidity constrained sample. For the health outcome the e⁄ect
is again instatistically di⁄erent to zero.30
One interpretation is that when faced with an unexpected change in income, poor house-
holds do raise their consumption by a larger proportion than a household in which a liquidity
constraint does not bind. However, the types of goods purchased may be di⁄erent. Attana-
sio et al (2005) analyse the expenditure patterns of parents in receipt of a cash transfer,
conditional upon their child￿ s attendance school, in the Familias en Accion programme in
Colombia. They ￿nd parents use the additional funds to raise consumption of protein rich
food and child clothing. Surprisingly, similar ￿ndings emerge from studies in more developed
countries. Gregg et al (2006) found that the result of numerous government policies to raise
household income was to enable poor families to catch up their richer counterparts, in terms
of clothing and housing costs. Indeed, a report by Farrell & O￿ Connor (2003) interviewed
37 households receiving the UK Working Family Tax Credit and additionally a survey by
Romich & Weisner (2000) on a sample of household receiving the Earned Income Tax Credit
in the US, found that recipients spend the additional money on household food consumption
and heating homes - necessity goods. As described above, a mechanism through which in-
come shocks are transferred into child human capital is through parental investment. Most
developed (and even developing) countries o⁄er a free state education. Therefore, in receipt
of an unexpected change in income, the evidence suggests that these poorer household do not
raise investment on books and private tuition for their children, as they are not necessities,
but rather heat the house, buy clothes and food. This would explain why a shock to income
raises schooling outcomes to a lesser extent for poor households than for rich households. Of
course, feeding children can also be seen as investment in children and the income shocks
have statistically similar e⁄ects on IQ in the constrained and the non-constrained house-
holds. This interpretation is observationally equivalent to the idea that poorer parents have
lower tastes for education.
This ￿nding warrants further research, as there are other explanations which include
that the welfare state in Norway insures poor families against income shocks or that poorer
households have higher discount rates. It is however unclear why these mechanisms would
insure all outcomes except for IQ, as for this outcome there was homogeneity in the e⁄ect
of both permanent and transitory income shocks for the poor households as for the total
sample.
30Permanent income shocks have a smaller magnitude between ages 0-4 and 12-16 in the liquidity con-
strained sample for the outcomes years of schooling, dropout, college and IQ, but no di⁄erence for health.
21The ￿nding that the stock of adolescent or adult human capital responds less to income
shocks for liquidity constrained parents is consistent with existing literature which ￿nd high
returns from interventions which raise investments in child human capital. For example,
Heckman et al (2009) ￿nd returns of 7-10% from the Perry Preschool Programme, which
provided quite intensive treatment for a randomly selected group of disadvantaged African
American families. Such a high return could be interpreted to indicate that this group of
families are not optimally investing in the human capital of their children. An alternative
explanation is that poorer families cannot prioritise investment in child human capital, but
rather choose to consume necessity goods. Hence, they are optimising but subject to binding
constraints and consequently direct intervention to raise the human capital of children can
be very e⁄ective.
7 Robustness Checks
A structural model for income generates the results presented above. Section 4 ascertained
the correct income process for the sample of parents in Norway, as an MA(1) or MA(2)
process for transitory income. This was well identi￿ed from a panel of around 400,000
families across 30 years. As a robustness check the e⁄ect on results from changing to the
income process to an MA(2) in transitory income is analysed in Section 7.1. Sections 7.2
and 7.3 explore the endogeneity of family income, by life cycle pro￿les of income and the
presence of siblings.
7.1 Assuming MA(2) Process for Transitory Income
Section 4 estimated a process for transitory income that was described by an MA(1) or an
MA(2). This section tests the sensitivity of the e⁄ect of permanent and transitory income
upon child human capital to the order of the MA process, by extending to a second order
process. That is, vit = "it + ￿1"it￿1 + ￿2"it￿2:
For all outcomes, the results are not statistically di⁄erent with the two processes for
transitory income. The results of the paper are robust to a substantial change in the assumed
income process used to decompose shocks into permanent and transitory components.
7.2 Are the shocks unexpected?
The methodology assumes that permanent income shocks are not foreseeable by families.
It may be however that ￿ uctuations in income which seem to an econometrician to be a
permanent shock were in fact predictable. If parents expected an increase (decrease) in their
22permanent income in the future, the families may raise (lower) contemporaneous investment
in child human capital. Consequently the response of human capital to the realised change
in permanent income will be subdued and the estimated e⁄ect of the true permanent shock
prone to a downward bias.
It is not possible to directly test whether changes in income which are de￿ned as unex-
pected accord with true expectations. However, it is possible to understand under which
conditions the misclassi￿cation of income changes would generate the results in the main
paper and subsequently test the sensitivity of these results to a change in these conditions.
Take a family which expects an upwards sloping life cycle pro￿le of permanent income
conditional on age, education and marital status.31 The PIH predicts that ceteris paribus,
this family would borrow early in life and save later in life to optimally smooth investment in
child human capital. Interpreting these changes in permanent income as unexpected would
lead human capital to seemingly "over-respond" to early low income and "under-react"
to later high income. This example would generate exactly the downward sloping pro￿le
estimated for the e⁄ect of permanent income shocks across child age.
Using the panel on household income I am able to categorise parents into di⁄erent life
cycle pro￿les and analyse the heterogeneity in the e⁄ect of permanent income shocks across
groups. If the above results for the e⁄ect of permanent income hold for households with non-
increasing life cycle pro￿les, it will be indicative that the methodology does not misclassify
foreseeable permanent income ￿ uctuations as unexpected.
Using a randomly selected sample of 40% of households, I run regressions of log household
income on the age of the child and the age squared. From the coe¢ cients, I categorise
the income pro￿le of each observation (of a parent-child pair) into an increasing pro￿le,
decreasing, inverse u-shaped and u-shaped. Then, I repeat the estimation from the bulk of
the paper, on the sample of households with an increasing life cycle pro￿le and all other
households.
The ￿rst point to note is that only 12.37% of households have an increasing life cycle
pro￿le, meaning that these are unlikely to be driving the result that permanent income has
a declining e⁄ect across child age. For the other households, 1.23%, 64.16% and 22.23% of
households were categorised as having decreasing, inverse-u and u-shaped pro￿les respec-
tively.32
Results, available upon request, show that for households with a non-increasing pro￿le,
there is no statistical di⁄erence in the relationship between permanent income shocks and
31They may expect a promotion in the following year or know of planned cuts to wage increases.
32This does not require the pro￿les to be signi￿cant. If the restriction is added that the pro￿les are
signi￿cant, the sample sizes change to 16.23%, 0.52%, 34.70% and 9.15% with the remaining households
having a ￿ at pro￿le across age.
23child outcomes as in the total sample. The results are robust to the life cycle pro￿le and
therefore to the test of the assumption that shocks are unexpected.
7.3 Siblings
Having a child can be seen as an income shock. With another mouth to feed, equivalised
income falls and there are spill-overs in investment goods bought for a child. For example,
a second child can read the book or learn from the tuition purchased for the ￿rst. If this is
the case, the e⁄ect of an income shock on human capital will be confounded by the presence
of other children in the household.
A step to test the bias from multiple children within a household is to select one child
families for analysis. With access to the population of Norwegian households, the remaining
sample size of 250,440 is su¢ ciently large to repeat the analysis.
The results show statistically similar e⁄ects of permanent income shocks upon all child
outcomes.
It is worth noting that in Figures 5a-5e, the age pro￿le of transitory income shocks shows
that whilst, from the age of 7 or so, there is a homogenous e⁄ect of transitory income shocks,
in early years the e⁄ect for the total sample lies above the e⁄ect for the sample of families
having no more children. For health, again, there is an insigni￿cant e⁄ect of transitory
income shocks for both samples. The results are suggestive that parents who do not have
more children are better able to insure their child against early transitory income shocks.
8 Conclusion
This paper has estimated the income process in Norway, for the population of parents having
children in the 1970s. Similarly to studies of other countries, Norwegian households￿income
process is best described by the sum of a deterministic, permanent and transitory component
where the permanent component follows a martingale and the transitory a moving average
process of order 1 or 2. Given this model for income, the next stage was to estimate annual
deviations of log household income from a life cycle pro￿le, and decompose these into yearly
permanent and transitory income shocks.
The e⁄ect of the shocks was estimated upon a range of cognitive and non-cognitive child
outcomes, to understand in which stages of child development the income shocks drive the
stock of adolescent human capital. Permanent income shocks have a stronger e⁄ect on child
outcomes early in life, and the e⁄ect falls to zero as the child ages. The reaction of IQ to
permanent shocks was slightly di⁄erent, as the e⁄ect failed to fall across the early years
24of child development. One reason could be that as suggested in the literature, IQ is more
malleable in the ￿rst ￿ve years of a child￿ s life and more sensitive to income shocks. For all
outcomes, there was volatility in the declining e⁄ect of permanent shocks across child age
and running the analysis using just father￿ s income led a large e⁄ect of an age 1 permanent
shock, which declined more smoothly across age for all outcomes. This result is intuitive,
because a permanent shock drives the household wealth and should drive human capital
investment by the annuity value of the shock. Therefore, a positive early shock will raise
this investment for more periods than a later shock.
There is a small and constant e⁄ect of transitory income shocks across child age. The
health outcome showed an insigni￿cant e⁄ect across child age of both the permanent and
transitory shocks, likely due to the crude measurement of health in the data. With the excep-
tion of health, in response to household permanent and transitory income shocks therefore,
the accumulation of human capital behaves similarly to consumption.
A divergence was noted however, when analysing a sample of liquidity constrained house-
holds. Whilst the consumption response to an income shock is expected to be larger for
liquidity constrained households, for four outcomes the human capital response is instead
smaller (although this di⁄erence is signi￿cant only for schooling and high school dropout).
An interpretation using evidence from numerous studies that suggest when faced with an
unexpected income change, poorer households raise their consumption on necessity goods,
such as clothing, heating and food. Indeed, with a free state education, investment goods
such as high quality schooling or books are not necessities. The policy implication from this
￿nding is that there is market failure in the investment into human capital of children from
poorer families. Consequently, direct government intervention to raise outcomes for this
group of children can potentially yield a high return, such as that estimated for the Perry
PreSchool Programme.
There is a question of generalisability, as Norway is richer and has a lower level of in-
equality than average. However, as the results still pointed to an e⁄ect of income shocks
on child outcomes, even this government is not fully insuring the households against income
shocks. Therefore, whilst a future research agenda is to carry out the same analysis on
countries with a less supportive welfare state, this paper still provides evidence of a lack of
full insurance against household income ￿ uctuations, albeit for a sample of households with
access to a relatively generous government insurance mechanism.
One caveat with this study is that whilst I observe income shocks and can infer ￿nancial
investment in children, I do not measure time investment. An appropriate model would see
two investment goods, which are potentially substitutes. Parents could respond to a negative
income shock by increasing the time or ￿nancial investment in their children, therefore
25insuring the child against the shock. This paper estimates the total e⁄ect, leaving analysis
of the mechanisms to future work.
Figure 1a Figure 1b
Note: The life cycle variance for mothers and fathers of the sample.
26Figures 2a-2j. The E⁄ect of Permanent and Transitory Income Shocks at ages 1-16 Upon
Child Human Capital Outcomes. Household Income.
Figure 2a Figure 2b
Figure 2c Figure 2d
Figure 2e Figure 2f
Note: DWMD model based upon permanent income following a random walk and transitory
income MA(1) estimates income shocks. Coe¢ cients represent standard deviations in the child
outcome and a 1 standard deviation change in the income shock. Education denotes years of schooling,
dropout indicates not leaving school at the compulsory age and college attendance at college/university.
27Figures 2a-2j. The E⁄ect of Permanent and Transitory Income Shocks at ages 1-16 Upon
Child Human Capital Outcomes. Household Income continued
Figure 2g Figure 2h
Figure 2i Figure 2j
Note: DWMD model based upon permanent income following a random walk and transitory
income MA(1) estimates income shocks. Coe¢ cients represent standard deviations in the child
outcome and a 1 standard deviation change in the income shock. IQ and health were measured for
males in the Armed Forces Test.
28Figures 3a-3e. The E⁄ect of Permanent Income Shocks at ages 1-16 Upon Child Human
Capital Outcomes. Paternal and Household Income.
Figure 3a Figure 3b
Figure 3c Figure 3d
Figure 3e
Note: DWMD model based upon permanent income following a random walk and transitory
income MA(1) estimates income shocks. Coe¢ cients represent standard deviations in the child
outcome and a 1 standard deviation change in the income shock.
29Figures 4a-4e. The E⁄ect of Transitory Income Shocks at ages 1-16 Upon Child Human
Capital Outcomes. Liquidity Constrained and Total Samples.
Figure 4a Figure 4b
Figure 4c Figure 4d
Figure 4e
Note:DWMD model based upon permanent income following a random walk and transitory
income MA(1) estimates income shocks. Coe¢ cients represent standard deviations in the child
outcome and a 1 standard deviation change in the income shock. Liquidity constrained sample:
permanent income in decile 2 or below.
30Figures 5a-5e. The E⁄ect of Transitory Income Shocks at ages 1-16 Upon Child Human
Capital Outcomes. Total Sample and Single Child Sample
Figure 5a Figure 5b
Figure 5c Figure 5d
Figure 5e
Note: Single children sample includes 250,440 children. DWMD model based upon permanent
income following a random walk and transitory income MA(1) estimates income shocks. Coe¢ cients
represent standard deviations in the child outcome and a 1 standard deviation change in the income
shock.
31Table 1: Sample Descriptives.
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Child’ s education 613522 12.7026 2.4450 8 21
Drop out High School 616210 0.2245 0.4172 0 1
College 616210 0.3893 0.4876 0 1
IQ (males) 290883 5.2081 1.8025 1 9
Health (males) 311163 8.4399 1.5237 1 9




Mother's age -0.0010 0.0138
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Father's age -0.0058 0.0037
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Mother's age squared 0.0000 -0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000002)
Father's age squared 0.0001 -0.00004
(0.0000) (0.0000002)
Mother's Education 0.0007 0.007
(0.0000) (0.00008)




Note: the dependent variable for column (1) is household ￿rst di⁄erence log income and for
column (2) is household log income. Standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes the 399,603
parents of children born in Norway, 1970-1980. Wage regressions from 1971-2004 in column 1
owing to the ￿rst di⁄erence speci￿cation and between 1970-2004 in column 2. Additional control



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































P0 0.0480 0.0211 0.0679 0.0494 0.0284
ε0 0.1093 0.0592 0.1283 0.1250 0.1831
ε1 0.0780 0.0472 0.1052 0.0893 0.1377
ε2 0.0842 0.0561 0.1090 0.1008 0.1528
ε3 0.0821 0.0597 0.1076 0.0991 0.1512
ε4 0.0915 0.0742 0.1120 0.1096 0.1642
ε5 0.0998 0.0789 0.1124 0.1135 0.1784
ε6 0.1064 0.0943 0.1102 0.1277 0.1841
ε7 0.1123 0.0905 0.1095 0.1454 0.1886
ε8 0.1168 0.0977 0.1088 0.1596 0.1974
ε9 0.1157 0.1006 0.1051 0.1607 0.1973
ε10 0.1202 0.0987 0.1007 0.1688 0.2086
ε11 0.1147 0.0968 0.0966 0.1751 0.1908
ε12 0.1086 0.0938 0.0891 0.1676 0.1831
ε13 0.0949 0.0918 0.0785 0.1608 0.1558
ε14 0.0786 0.0829 0.0724 0.1436 0.1306
ε15 0.0580 0.0722 0.0640 0.1219 0.0996
ε16 0.0387 0.0696 0.0496 0.0924 0.0691
ε17 0.0310 0.0394 0.0330 0.0676 0.0597
ζ1 0.0051 0.0077 0.0036 0.0061 0.0055
ζ2 0.0065 0.0087 0.0098 0.0071 0.0066
ζ3 0.0063 0.0089 0.0076 0.0077 0.0063
ζ4 0.0060 0.0097 0.0070 0.0071 0.0068
ζ5 0.0056 0.0086 0.0063 0.0074 0.0064
ζ6 0.0058 0.0093 0.0050 0.0077 0.0072
ζ7 0.0056 0.0085 0.0041 0.0074 0.0068
ζ8 0.0063 0.0117 0.0045 0.0086 0.0085
ζ9 0.0060 0.0101 0.0048 0.0080 0.0087
ζ10 0.0069 0.0127 0.0057 0.0095 0.0102
ζ11 0.0071 0.0145 0.0053 0.0110 0.0111
ζ12 0.0098 0.0191 0.0070 0.0122 0.0159
ζ13 0.0125 0.0301 0.0077 0.0178 0.0193
ζ14 0.0141 0.0347 0.0099 0.0203 0.0212
ζ15 0.0111 0.0268 0.0031 0.0196 0.0225
ζ16 0.0066 0.0210 0.0000 0.0093 0.0131
ζ17 0.0310 0.0394 0.0330 0.0676 0.0597
θ -0.8336 0.1927 -0.7772 -0.6913 -0.8020













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ISSN 2045-6557Table 6a: The E⁄ect of The Timing of Transitory Shocks, Initial Permanent Income (Pe-
riod 0) and Permanent Shocks upon Child Outcomes: Without Restrictions on Coe¢ cients
Across Child Age. Household Income.
Education High School College
Child Age Permanent Transitory Permanent Transitory Permanent Transitory
0 0.3795 0.2668 0.3494
(0.0085) (0.0080) (0.0086)
1 0.0866 0.0327 0.0599 0.0364 0.0659 0.0234
(0.0141) (0.0060) (0.0126) (0.0061) (0.0141) (0.0061)
2 0.1116 0.0320 0.0892 0.0340 0.1056 0.0243
(0.0107) (0.0050) (0.0106) (0.0051) (0.0108) (0.0051)
3 0.0712 0.0407 0.0568 0.0328 0.0649 0.0360
(0.0097) (0.0047) (0.0099) (0.0048) (0.0099) (0.0047)
4 0.0659 0.0375 0.0517 0.0283 0.0726 0.0353
(0.0089) (0.0041) (0.0088) (0.0042) (0.0091) (0.0041)
5 0.0668 0.0494 0.0554 0.0432 0.0715 0.0408
(0.0086) (0.0038) (0.0088) (0.0040) (0.0087) (0.0039)
6 0.0980 0.0426 0.0774 0.0320 0.0975 0.0435
(0.0089) (0.0039) (0.0091) (0.0040) (0.0090) (0.0039)
7 0.0705 0.0441 0.0629 0.0299 0.0755 0.0408
(0.0091) (0.0038) (0.0089) (0.0039) (0.0093) (0.0037)
8 0.0653 0.0567 0.0534 0.0398 0.0591 0.0481
(0.0088) (0.0038) (0.0087) (0.0039) (0.0088) (0.0037)
9 0.0879 0.0503 0.0688 0.0323 0.0765 0.0504
(0.0085) (0.0038) (0.0085) (0.0039) (0.0084) (0.0038)
10 0.0539 0.0480 0.0419 0.0325 0.0498 0.0469
(0.0071) (0.0037) (0.0071) (0.0037) (0.0070) (0.0037)
11 0.0584 0.0582 0.0422 0.0389 0.0469 0.0576
(0.0072) (0.0037) (0.0072) (0.0039) (0.0070) (0.0037)
12 0.0651 0.0465 0.0468 0.0316 0.0558 0.0421
(0.0063) (0.0040) (0.0062) (0.0040) (0.0061) (0.0038)
13 0.0344 0.0416 0.0231 0.0329 0.0249 0.0368
(0.0045) (0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0038)
14 0.0232 0.0398 0.0137 0.0320 0.0250 0.0350
(0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0039)
15 0.0281 0.0286 0.0306 0.0254 0.0155 0.0255
(0.0063) (0.0038) (0.0062) (0.0037) (0.0060) (0.0037)
16 0.0019 0.0378 0.0094 0.0349 -0.0077 0.0325
(0.0068) (0.0043) (0.0069) (0.0043) (0.0066) (0.0042)
Note: standard errors in parentheses. Coe¢ cients and standard errors represent standard deviations in
dependent variables and a 1 standard deviation change in the income shock. The permanent shock in year 0
represents P0, the initial level of permanent income. Estimates using household income. DWMD estimates
income shocks. Permanent income follows a martingale and transitory income a MA(1) process. Education
denotes years of schooling, dropout indicates not leaving school at the compulsory age and college attendance
at college/university.
36Table 6b: The E⁄ect of The Timing of Transitory Shocks, Initial Permanent Income (Pe-
riod 0) and Permanent Shocks upon Child Outcomes: Without Restrictions on Coe¢ cients
Across Child Age. Household Income.
IQ Health
Child Age Permanent Transitory Permanent Transitory
0 0.2895 0.0230
(0.0114) (0.0102)
1 0.0859 0.0280 0.0063 0.0034
(0.0184) (0.0085) (0.0158) (0.0077)
2 0.1080 0.0288 0.0023 0.0053
(0.0143) (0.0073) (0.0129) (0.0065)
3 0.0850 0.0235 0.0285 -0.0040
(0.0138) (0.0066) (0.0123) (0.0061)
4 0.1056 0.0258 0.0197 -0.0029
(0.0124) (0.0058) (0.0110) (0.0055)
5 0.0808 0.0406 0.0085 0.0003
(0.0123) (0.0055) (0.0103) (0.0051)
6 0.0900 0.0448 0.0018 -0.0003
(0.0124) (0.0056) (0.0116) (0.0051)
7 0.0852 0.0277 0.0205 0.0047
(0.0127) (0.0056) (0.0113) (0.0052)
8 0.1110 0.0226 0.0111 0.0014
(0.0119) (0.0054) (0.0105) (0.0050)
9 0.0519 0.0216 0.0105 -0.0052
(0.0117) (0.0054) (0.0097) (0.0046)
10 0.0504 0.0150 0.0160 -0.0026
(0.0102) (0.0054) (0.0085) (0.0045)
11 0.0335 0.0276 0.0094 -0.0031
(0.0104) (0.0053) (0.0087) (0.0046)
12 0.0298 0.0330 -0.0002 -0.0108
(0.0084) (0.0055) (0.0071) (0.0049)
13 0.0293 0.0269 0.0032 -0.0085
(0.0062) (0.0056) (0.0051) (0.0049)
14 0.0018 0.0313 -0.0017 -0.0010
(0.0057) (0.0053) (0.0048) (0.0046)
15 0.0198 0.0270 0.0095 -0.0076
(0.0086) (0.0051) (0.0070) (0.0041)
16 -0.0076 0.0317 -0.0071 0.0001
(0.0092) (0.0058) (0.0074) (0.0047)
Note: standard errors in parentheses. Coe¢ cients and standard errors represent standard deviations in
dependent variables and a 1 standard deviation change in the income shock. The permanent shock in year 0
represents P0, the initial level of permanent income. Estimates using household income. DWMD estimates
income shocks. Permanent income follows a martingale and transitory income a MA(1) process. IQ and
health were measured for males in the Armed Forces Test.
379 Appendix 1. Estimation by DWMD
Estimation is by minimum distance. For each observation, I observe the scalar hiT and de￿ne
the dummy variable dh
i to equal 1 if human capital is non-missing for this observation, and 0
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2 unique moments. The vector of theoretical moments is given by f (￿)
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38Choose parameter values to minimise the di⁄erence between the theoretical moments,
given in the identi￿cation section above, and the empirical moments contained in m.
min
￿
(m ￿ f (￿))
0 ￿ A(m ￿ f (￿))
The weighting matrix (A) is the diagonal from (V ￿1); where V is the variance-covariance
matrix of m, consequently estimation is diagonally-weighted minimum distance (DWMD).
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